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ARTICLES

ETHICAL RULES PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION
BY LAWYERS: THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S
RESPONSE TO DISCRIMINATION
ON THE RISE
BRENDA JONES QUICK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1955, when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat to a
white person on a Montgomery, Alabama bus, it is unlikely that
she ever anticipated the fallout that would occur from her
arrest.' The boycott of the Montgomery public bus system that
followed sent shock waves through a nation and sparked the
beginning of what became known as the civil rights movement.
The movement brought about unprecedented change in the
law and much of society's way of viewing its minority members.' Some evidence of the movement's success is the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' which prohibits, among other things,
employment discrimination. 4 The Act was passed during the
* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; B.A. 1981,
University of Louisville; J.D. 1985, University of Louisville. I would like to
express my appreciation to David Safavian, a student at the Detroit College of
Law, for his assistance in the research of this article. Also, my thanks to Dean
Albert T. Quick, Pettit College of Law at Ohio Northern University, for his
many hours of assistance and support. Thank you to Professor John Soave,
Detroit College of Law, for reading a draft of this article and his helpful
comments and suggestions.
1. On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks, an African-American woman, was
riding a public bus when she was ordered by the bus driver to vacate her seat
so that a white man could sit down. The area in which she was sitting was in
that part of the bus known as "no-man's-land." When she refused, she was
arrested. Her arrest led to the Montgomery bus boycott which resulted in the
buses of Montgomery, Alabama becoming integrated. TAYLOR BRANCH,
PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63, at 128-29

(1988).
2. Id.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (1964).
4. Id.
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presidency of Lyndon Johnson, a Southern democrat. Subsequently, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was enacted which prohibits certain types of discrimination in housing,5 age
6 , and discrimination against women in the work
discrimination
7
place.
Through legislation and court decisions, our nation has
attempted to end the discriminatory practices that have permeated society. Unfortunately, no matter how successful the civil
rights laws have been, they alone have not been sufficient to
eliminate the evils of discrimination. In fact, today the discrimination and bigotry the civil rights movement had hoped to
eliminate appears to be gaining strength. For example, while
David Duke, former Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan, lost
his bid for governor of Louisiana, he still received 39% of the
vote.' Much of Mr. Duke's campaign was based upon his claim
that white Christians no longer are getting a fair shake.9
In response to the resurgence of blatant and outspoken
bigotry, initiatives have been undertaken to once again curtail
such conduct. On the national front, Congress recently passed
the Civil Rights Act of 199 1,l° the purpose of which is "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and
unlawful harassment in the workplace . . . . " Locally, some
colleges and universities have taken bold steps to eradicate bigoted behavior on their campuses by adopting rules prohibiting
hate-speech.'" Also, lawyers in California, Michigan and New
5. Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1968).
6. Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-07 (1975).
7. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-el7 (1964).
8. Duke Goes Down in Defeat, TIME, Dec. 16, 1991, at 6.
9. Mr. Duke also ran a short race for President of the United States. He
claimed that, "The country is overwhelmingly of European descent. It's
overwhelmingly Christian. And if we lose its underpinning, I think we're
going to lose the foundations of America." Carl M. Cannon, Duke Opens
Challenge to Bush, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 5, 1991, at 3A. Furthermore, he said
the U.S. should get tough on the Japanese, "You no buy our rice, we no buy
your cars." Id.
10. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991).
11. Id.§ 3.
12. According to Professor Richard Delgado, the Universities of
California, Connecticut, Michigan, North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Texas, Brown University, Emory University,
Pennsylvania State University, Tufts University, Trinity College and Mt.
Holyoke have adopted anti-harassment policies. See Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: ConstitutionalNarrativesin Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 358

n.121 (1991) [hereinafter Campus Antiracism Rules].
The University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin's rules were
stricken by the courts as unconstitutional. UWM Post v. Board of Regents,
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Jersey, after discovering discriminatory practices and, conduct
among their members, have enacted or have proposed amendments to their Rules of Professional Conduct to prohibit such
conduct. California's proposed rule and New Jersey's ethics
Rule 8.4 as amended, are limited to restricting a lawyer's professional conduct. Michigan's proposed rule, however, encompasses much more. The Michigan rule places restrictions on a
lawyer's conduct both in the lawyer's professional and private
life.
California has proposed three rules."3 The first states in
part:
(A) In the management or operation of a law firm or law
practice, a member shall not unlawfully 14 discriminate or knowingly permit unlawful discrimination on
the basis of race, national origin, sex [sexual orientation,] religion, age or disability in:
(1) hiring, promoting, discharging or otherwise
determining the conditions of employment of
any person, or
(2) accepting or terminating representation of any
client. 15

The second proposed rule prohibits a lawyer from engaging in similar discrimination in the performance of legal serv774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp.
852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
13. California has considered anti-discrimination ethics rules proposals
since 1986. The most recent, in 1990, stated as follows:
An attorney shall refrain from manifesting, by words or
conduct, bias or prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socio-economic status,
against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others. This rule does not
preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socio-economic or other
similar factors are issues in the proceedings.
This rule was redrafted after serious concerns were expressed about the proposal's ability to withstand a constitutional challenge. Interestingly, the arguments that influenced the committee's decision to redraft the rule are similar
to the arguments I make in this article to show that the Michigan rule probably will fail if challenged. See Office of Professional Competence, Planning
and Development, State Bar of California, Report and Recommendation Regarding
Proposed New Rules of Professional Conduct on Bias and Employment Discrimination
(Oct. 1991).
14. Section (B) of the rule says that "unlawful" is "determined by
reference to applicable California or federal statutes forbidding such
discrimination
in employment
and in the offering of business
establishments."
15. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed Rule 2400 (1991) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA RULES].

8
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ices. 6 The third rule is limited to restrictions on a lawyer's
conduct in trial practice.17
New Jersey's amended ethics Rule 8.4 (g) is as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
engage in a professional capacity, in conduct involving discrimination (except employment discrimination unless resulting in a final agency or judicial
determination) because of race, color, religion, age,
sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, socioeconomic status, or handicaps, where the
conduct is intended or likely to cause harm.'"
Michigan's proposed rule, as previously stated, is broader
in scope. It states:
Discriminatory Practices:
(a) A lawyer shall not engage in invidious discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation, or ethnic origin
and shall prohibit staff and agents subject to the
lawyer's direction and control from doing so.
(b) A lawyer shall not hold membership in any
organization which the lawyer knows invidiously
discriminates on the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation or ethnic
origin.
(c) A lawyer serving as an adjudicative officer shall
prohibit invidious discrimination on the basis of
gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation, or ethnic origin, against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others on the part of lawyers
in proceedings before the adjudicative officer.' 9
16. Id. Proposed Rule 3-220(A) states: "In the performance of legal
services, a member shall not threaten, harass, embarrass or impugn any other
person on the basis of race, national origin, sex, [sexual orientation,] religion,

age or disability." Section (B) of this rule makes an exception for speech and

conduct that is protected by the federal and state Constitutions.
17. Id. Proposed Rule 5-200(F) prohibits a lawyer from threatening,
harassing, embarrassing, or impugning "any party in the matter or any other
lawyer, witness, juror or prospective juror, judge, judicial officer, or tribunal
employee on the basis of the party's or individual's race, national origin, sex,
[sexual orientation,] religion, age or disability." This rule also has an
exception for constitutionally protected speech and conduct.

18.

NEW JERSEY

RULES

OF

PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT

Rule 8. 4 (g)

(1990) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY RULES].
19. The State Bar of Michigan has recommended that the Michigan
Supreme Court adopt MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed
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These proposed and adopted ethics rules have been and
2 °
continue to be hotly debated by the members of those bars,
in part because the rules are not advisory, but obligate and subject lawyers to sanctions if they are violated. 2 ' Of particular
concern is seeing that the rules are drafted in such a way that
they are clear, enforceable, and can survive a constitutional
challenge.2 2
The purpose of this article is to examine some of the issues
that have been raised regarding the newly adopted and proposed anti-discrimination ethics rules. More specifically, it will
address the potential conflicts and limitations the rules have
with other sections of the ethics codes, the constitutional issues
that have been raised, and which of the rules, if any, may survive constitutional scrutiny.
II.
A.

THE ETHICS RULES

Representing the Unwanted Client

1. Conflicts and limitations with other sections of the ethics
codes.
a. Accepting a prospective client
Prior to the proposed and adopted anti-discrimination
rules, lawyers had an almost unfettered right to represent clients of their choice, or perhaps more importantly, the right not
to represent certain persons. 23 Lawyers have been able to
refuse to represent clients for whatever reason-"because the
client is not of the lawyer's race or socioeconomic status;
Rule 5.7 (1988) [hereinafter MICHIGAN RULES]. The supreme court has not
ruled on the proposal at this time.
20. See Ingrid Farquharson et al., Can Rules Eliminate "Invidious
Discrimination"?, 69 MICH. B.J. 1280 (1990); John Leo, Our Misguided Speech
Police, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 8, 1991, at 25.
21. The Preamble of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states in
part: "Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule
is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process."
22. See Transcript of the Representative Assembly State Bar of
Michigan (Sept. 13, 1990) at 88-152 [hereinafter Transcript]; Memorandum
from David Bell, Office of Professional Competence, Planning and
Development, to the Board Committee on Admissions and Competence re
1991)[hereinafter Memorandum]; Office of
Gender Bias (Apr. 10,
Professional Competence, Planning and Development, State Bar of
California, Report and Recommendation Regarding Proposed New Rules of
Professional Conduct on Bias and Employment Discrimination (Oct. 1991)(available
from State Bar of California).
23. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.2.2, at 573
(1986).
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because the client is weird or not, tall or short, thin or fat,
moral or immoral." 2 4 The only exceptions to this rule have
been a lawyer's duty to represent the unpopular client 2 5 and
the duty to accept court appointments.2 6 But even with court
appointments, a lawyer has been able to seek avoidance of an
appointment if certain conditions exist. 27 Included among
these conditions is the right to avoid appointment if the lawyer
considers the client so repugnant that the attorney-client relationship will be impaired, or the lawyer believes the repugnancy will result in28 the lawyer not being able to properly
represent the client.
In keeping with these good cause exceptions, the courts
have found that a lawyer's personal prejudice against a prospective client is a legitimate reason for declining representation. 2' As explained by a California court, "The acceptance of
a client by a lawyer involves a complex set of personal and professional judgments. Included in this calculus is the attorney's
evaluation of whether he or she harbors any feelings of repugnance for the client. "30 The court recognized that there is
more to the attorney-client relationship than the law. It
24.
25.

Id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule

6.2 cmt.

(1992)[hereinafter MODEL RULES], which states in part, "An individual lawyer
fulfills this [pro bono publico service] responsibility by accepting a fair share
of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients."; see also MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-27 (1983)[hereinafter MODEL CODE];

State v. Maddux, 571 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. 1978).
26.

MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 6.2 states in pertinent part:

A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to
represent a person except for good cause, such as:
(a) representing the client is likely to result in a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to
be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the
lawyer's ability to represent the client.
Michigan and New Jersey have adopted this rule. See also MODEL CODE,

supra note 25, EC 2-29.
27.

MODEL RULES,

supra note 25, Rule

6.2.

For

California,

see

Cunningham v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1986).
28.

MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 6.2(c).

29. A contempt charge against a lawyer was dismissed after the
Supreme Court found that the lawyer's attempts to avoid a court
appointment were based on alleged conflicts of interest and his personal
prejudice against the defendant. State v. Maddux, 571 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn.
1978).
30. Cunningham v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 222 Cal. Rptr.
854, 867 (1986).
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involves communications between two human beings. Therefore, the court believed that if the lawyer and client are unable
to communicate effectively for whatever reason, the relationship should not exist. 3
The anti-discrimination rules would limit these good cause
exceptions. 2 To explain, if the repugnancy is based on something other than the fact that the prospective client belongs to
one of the groups identified in the anti-discrimination rules,
the lawyer may rely on the good cause exceptions and refuse to
represent the client. However, if the client falls into one of
those groups and the lawyer does not want to represent the
client because of his membership in that group, then the lawyer
cannot refuse to accept the prospective client notwithstanding
the lawyer's personal feelings. California's Proposed Rule 2400(A)(2) expressly prohibits refusing to accept a client on the
basis of race, national origin, sex, religion, age or disability. 3
And while Michigan and New Jersey's rules do not include similar language, that prohibition is implicit in those rules by virtue
of their application. For example, assume that Mary has an
aversion to Presbyterians. Fred, a Presbyterian, wants to hire
Mary to represent him in a lawsuit against his former employer,
the University of Higher Learning. He claims that he was
denied tenure because he was a Presbyterian, and not because
he did not satisfy the requirements for tenure. If Mary refuses
to represent Fred for the sole reason that she does not want to
have a Presbyterian as a client, she has violated the Michigan
and New Jersey anti-discrimination rules because she has discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, something
she is not permitted to do under either rule. 4 Thus in order to
avoid unethical conduct, she will be forced to accept Fred as a
client notwithstanding her personal feelings.
b.

Withdrawing as counsel

In addition to the traditionally recognized right of a lawyer
to refuse to accept a prospective client, a lawyer also has the
right to withdraw from a case if she discovers at some future
date that her client is so repugnant to her that she cannot in
good conscience continue with the representation. 5 In fact,
31.
WOLFRAM, supra note 23, § 4.3, at 158-59.
32. CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 15, Proposed Rule 2-400(A)(2);
MICHIGAN RULES, supra note 19, Proposed Rule 5.7; NEW JERSEY RULES, supra
note 18, Rule 8. 4 (g).
33. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
35. See CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 15, Rule 3-700(c)(6); MICHIGAN
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the ethics codes require a lawyer to withdraw if the lawyer is
unable to represent the client as mandated under the rules.3 6
The proposed and adopted anti-discrimination rules suggest a
significant change from this right to withdraw as counsel. 3 7 By
strict interpretation of the rules, a lawyer could not withdraw
from a case if the basis for that withdrawal was the fact that the
client falls within one of those classes of persons as defined
under the rules.
It is important to note, however, that by complying with
the anti-discrimination rules a lawyer could find herself in violation of other ethics rules. Once a lawyer has accepted a client, she has a continuing duty to zealously and competently
represent him, 38 and if she cannot do this, she is required to
withdraw as counsel. 39 But if the lawyer attempts to withdraw
because she cannot represent the client as required under the
code, and the reason for her failure to provide the appropriate
representation is that she finds the client repugnant because
the client is a member of one of the classes identified in the
anti-discrimination rules, she violates the anti-discrimination
RULES, supra note 19, Rule 1.16(b)(6); NEW JERSEY RULES, supra note 18, Rule
1. 16(b) (6).
36. For Michigan and New Jersey, Rule 1.16(a)(1) requires a lawyer to
withdraw from representation if such representation would result in the
lawyer violating her code of ethics. For California, see Rule 3-700(B)(2). It
may be argued that if the lawyer finds the client so repugnant that the lawyer
cannot continue zealous representation, she is obligated to withdraw. See
CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 15, Proposed Rule 3-110; Michigan Rules,
supra note 19, Rule 1.3; NEW JERSEY RULES, supra note 18, Rule 1.3.
37. The scope of the proposed and adopted rules is limited in that
those rules only apply to situations that involve certain types of
discriminatory conduct and speech against persons who fall within certain
identifiable groups such as race, gender, religion, disability, age, and sexual
orientation. California also includes national origin and socio-economic
factors. New Jersey includes marital status. All other cases would remain the
same as before under the rules.
38. New Jersey and Michigan's Rule 1.1 requires in part: "[a] lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client." Rule 1.3 requires "[a]
lawyer [to] act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client." Furthermore, the Comment to Michigan's Rule 1.3 states in part: "A
lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." California's Rule
3-110 requires a lawyer to perform all services competently. The rules go on
to define "competently" as applying the law and the lawyer's skills diligently.
A lawyer's "ability" is defined as, among other things, having the emotional
ability to perform the necessary legal services.
39. CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 15, Rule 700(B)(2); MICHIGAN RULES,
supra note 19, Rule 1.16(a)(1); NEW JERSEY RULES, supra note 18, Rule
1. 16(a) (1).
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rules. Clearly, this places the lawyer in an awkward position.
She is "damned if she does, and damned if she doesn't."
2.

Personal prejudices and professional obligations.

The anti-discrimination rules can be effective only if lawyers are able to conform their behavior accordingly. Thus, the
question that needs to be asked with regard to the anti-discrimination rules is whether it is realistic to expect a lawyer to
ignore and put aside her personal prejudices and biases if she
wants to remain a lawyer in good standing.
This question has been the subject of prior debate. One
approach has been adopted by those who claim the lawyer's
first obligation is to serve the public and see that society's trust
in the legal system remains intact. They believe that these
duties can be accomplished only if the lawyer puts aside her
personal prejudices and biases.4 ° Certainly, the Michigan Ethics Committee has adopted this position. It reported that the
purpose of that jurisdiction's proposed anti-discrimination rule
was to protect the public's confidence in the legal system. 4 ' As
stated in their report, "[a]ny manifestation of invidious discrimination by lawyers or judges damages public confidence in
the fairness and impartiality of the administration ofjustice. '"42
Furthermore, the supporters of this position argue that all
persons who are entitled to the protection of the law must have
access to the courts, particularly since the legal system is so
complex that most persons are dependent upon lawyers to walk
them through it.4 3 They believe that the greatest injustice a
person could suffer would be the denial of access to the legal
system that was designed to protect him because a lawyer's personal prejudices resulted in the lawyer's refusal to accept him
as a client.4 4 Thus, it is the lawyer's responsibility to overcome
40. Michigan Bar Approves Antibias Rules for Codes of Conduct, B. LEADER,
Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 4 [hereinafter Michigan Bar Approves Antibias Rules];
Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community and Lawyers'Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV.
939 (1990); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD
LAWYER 150, 164-69 (David Luban ed., 1983).
41. Michigan Bar Approves Antibias Rules, supra note 40, at 4.
42. Id.
43. Pepper, supra note 40, at 940.
44. See generally Schwartz, supra note 40, at 164-69. This argument
would apply only in the most extreme circumstances. For example, if an
African-American lived in a small community that had only three lawyers, all
of whom despised and refused to represent blacks, the African-American
might have difficulty taking his case to court if he could not find a lawyer from
another town to represent him. His only choice might be to file his complaint
pro se, which might be no choice at all, if the litigation is complex. However, it
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her prejudices and provide the legal assistance necessary to
help the client. If she cannot do this, she must bear the weight
45
of possible sanctions for violating her code of ethics.
On the other hand, many ethics scholars suggest that a
lawyer should not be forced to accept a client she cannot adequately represent.4 6 Furthermore, she has a duty to withdraw
from a case if proper representation cannot be maintained.4 7
As explained by Professor Geoffery Hazard, "Indeed, a lawyer
must reject a case if she knows or reasonably believes that
because of moral qualms she will not be able to provide full
zealous representation. "48 This is so even if it means the
potential client may have to find access to the courts with the
aid of another lawyer. These scholars recognize that persons
with meritorious claims are entitled to access to the courts;
however, they believe that the means of providing that access
should not be enforced through the ethics codes. Universal
access to the courts is hardly the purpose for which the ethics
codes were adopted.4"
The second approach, while on the surface appearing
harsh, is much more realistic than the first. It recognizes
human nature for what it is and accepts the inevitable. If a lawyer is forced to represent a client that she does not want "[the]
quality of the ...

service can be expected to decrease in almost

direct proportion to the loss of choice of the professional in
rendering the service." 50 A client has the right to expect loyalty51 , competence 52, and zealous representation5 3 from his
lawyer. However, where the representation is forced, these
minimum standards may be lacking. Furthermore, if the lawyer
would be extremely rare for any person with a meritorious claim, regardless
of his race, sexual preference, or other characteristic, to be unable to find a
lawyer to represent him.
45. In addition to disciplinary charges, the lawyer also may face the
possibility of a legal malpractice suit filed by the disgruntled client.
46. GEOFFERY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
LAWYERING § 1.2:302, at n. 1 (2d ed. 1990).

47.

HODES, THE LAW OF

48.

MODEL CODE, supra note 25, Rule 1.16(a)(l).
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 46, § 1.2:302, at 35 & n.l.

49.

DAVID

LUBAN,

LAWYERS

AND JUSTICE:

AN

ETHICAL STUDY

239

(1988).
50. Cunningham v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 222 Cal. Rptr.
854, 866 (1986).
51. MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.7 cmt. states: "Loyalty is an
essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client."
52. Id. Rule 1.1.
53. Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. states in part: "A lawyer should act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf."
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fails in any of these, it is the client who suffers and will pay the
price of the poor representation.
The fact that the lawyer may be disciplined under the ethics code will bring little solace to an injured client. The client
may have to resort to a legal malpractice suit to recover some
of his losses and such a case is not easy to win. Moreover, the
client would be forced to litigate his case twice. First, he tries
the case with lawyer number one, the lawyer who does not want
to represent him, and again in the legal malpractice suit where
he has to convince the trier of fact that he would have won the
first time around had it not been for his representation by lawyer number one. Furthermore, a malpractice suit will cost him
additional attorneys' fees and expenses. This does not take
into account the loss of respect for the legal system the client
likely will suffer. It would seem that if lawyer number one had
been able to refuse to accept the client when the services originally were sought, the client possibly would have been spared
all this unpleasantness and additional expense. Certainly, the
public will gain nothing if representation is forced and the representation results in only more problems for an already troubled client.
Furthermore, if one accepts the proposition that some, if
not most, lawyers are unable to separate their personal values
and prejudices from their professional responsibilities, a lawyer
who wishes to avoid sanctions for violating the code of ethics
still may do so by hiding her real reasons for refusing to represent the client. The lawyer knows that if she fails to represent
the client within the parameters of the code, she may be subjected to sanctions. Therefore, she may choose to take what
she sees as the only way out by articulating an acceptable conflict that would allow her to escape from representing the
unwanted client. If no acceptable conflict can be found, she
simply may resort to fabricating a reason that appears legitimate on the surface. In other words, she will lie. This does not
mean she is not in violation of the ethics code, 54 but it probably
will protect her from sanctions. Moreover, it is unlikely that
her deceit will be discovered unless she has a pattern of
rejecting clients who fall within the protection of the rule.
Thus, it is obvious that enforcement of the rule, at least in this
situation, could be extremely difficult, if not impossible.
54. By lying about her reasons for refusing the client, she violates not
only the anti-discrimination rule, but also MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule
8.4(c) which states that "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (c)
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."

16
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Control Over the Lawyer's Employees

The proposed California anti-discrimination rules and the
adopted New Jersey anti-discrimination rule make no reference
to a lawyer's duty regarding her employees' conduct; however,
other existing ethics rules make lawyers in those jurisdictions
as well as in Michigan responsible for the conduct of employees
under their supervision. Rule 5.3 of the Michigan and New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct states:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by
or associated with a lawyer:
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over
the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the person's conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer.
The comment following California's Rule 3-110 indicates
that lawyers in that jurisdiction have a similar duty.5 5 Thus,
lawyers must make all reasonable efforts to see that their nonlawyer employees refrain from engaging in inappropriate conduct in the performance of their duties.
However, it appears that the State Bar of Michigan did not
believe that Rule 5.3 was adequate to guarantee that lawyers
will do what is necessary to see that their staff and agents
refrain from engaging in discriminatory conduct. As a result,
expressly written into Michigan's proposed anti-discrimination
rule is a requirement that a lawyer must "prohibit staff and
agents subject to the lawyer's direction and control from
[engaging in invidious discrimination].... .56 This language
appears to impose upon a lawyer a much greater duty than that
imposed upon her under Rule 5.3.
First, the proposed Michigan rule makes no reference to a
standard of reasonableness as does Rule 5.3. Instead, the rule
requires that a lawyer follow a strict standard of accountability
to prohibit invidious discrimination by her employees and
agents. The strict standard of accountability will force a lawyer
to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the prohibited conduct does not occur. This would mean that a lawyer
will have to take extraordinary measures, if necessary, to curb
55. See CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 15, Rule 3-110 cmt.
56. MICHIGAN RULES, supra note 19, Proposed Rule 5.7(a) states in
pertinent part that "A lawyer shall not engage in invidious discrimination...
and shall prohibit staff and agents subject to the lawyer's direction and
control from doing so." The New Jersey and California rules do not include
this requirement.
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the discrimination even if it means going beyond what ordinarily is considered reasonable.
Second, the proposed Michigan rule appears to impose
accountability upon a lawyer for the conduct of some employees and agents for which she would not be held responsible
under Rule 5.3. The proposed Michigan rule refers to all "staff
and agents subject to the lawyer's direction and control." Rule
5.3 limits the lawyer's obligation to overseeing the conduct
only of those employees for whom a lawyer has "direct supervisory authority." Clearly, it is possible to have general direction
and control over an employee or agent without having direct
supervisory authority over him. For example, an associate with
a law firm may direct and control a paralegal's work with regard
to a particular client; however, the associate probably will have
no authority to discipline or terminate the paralegal if the
paralegal engages in prohibited discriminatory conduct. Nevertheless, under Michigan's proposed rule, the associate would
be responsible for seeing that the paralegal does not engage in
such conduct.
Third, Rule 5.3 recognizes that nonlawyers may "need
time to adjust to their quasi-professional roles, for they may
not have been subject to such norms before, or have been
aware that they exist." 7 The Michigan anti-discrimination rule
makes no allowances for an adjustment period. The lawyer's
staff and agents are required to conform their conduct
immediately.
It appears that the drafters of the proposed Michigan rule
found the conduct in question so offensive that they decided to
impose a much higher standard on lawyers than has bound
them in the past, at least with regard to certain types of discriminatory conduct by their staff and agents. This may be the reason that the drafters added a section to the new rule rather
than rely on the existing code for governance. However, by
imposing this higher standard, several questions are raised.
What happens if the staff person or agent engages in prohibited discriminatory conduct notwithstanding prior warnings to
the contrary? What if the lawyer did not inform the nonlawyer
about the anti-discrimination rule because she believed her
employee or agent incapable of committing such an act? Will
the lawyer be subject to sanctions because the misconduct has
occurred? What type of action must the lawyer take against the
offender? Must the staff person or agent be terminated, or will
a reprimand be sufficient? What if the lawyer has no supervi57.

HAZARD

&

HODES,

supra note 46, § 5.3:102.
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sory authority over the employee and cannot discipline the
employee?
To date, there are no apparent answers to these questions.
Consequently, it puts lawyers in the precarious position of having a responsibility under the rule, but with no direction as to
how that responsibility should be fulfilled.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

A.

Introduction

It is my contention that the proposed Michigan rule and
the adopted New Jersey rule raise constitutional questions that
place their survival in jeopardy. More specifically, the rules
attempt to prohibit certain types of speech and conduct, much
of which is protected under the First Amendment of the
Constitution.
First, this section will summarize the perspectives and legal
arguments of those who support broad restrictions against certain types of discriminatory speech and conduct.5" Following
that discussion, will be my critical examination of those arguments. I will attempt to show why I believe the arguments of
the proponents have little legal bases. Lastly, I have included a
discussion of constitutional issues that were not raised by the
proponents, but I believe are critical in determining whether
the rules are constitutional.
B.

In Support of Regulation

While most of the literature written in support of regulating discriminatory conduct has been confined to the regulation
of racist and anti-semitic speech, 59 some of the proponents of
such regulation have expressed their support of public restric58. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444. Professor Lawrence states
that "[r]acism is both 100% speech and 100% conduct." Id.
59. See, e.g., Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 12; Richard Delgado,
Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Words that Wound]; Lawrence,
supra note 58; Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2331 (1989). But see CATHARINE
MACKINNON,

FEMINISM

UNMODIFIED,

DISCOURSES

ON LIFE AND

THE

LAW

'(1987). Many of Professor MacKinnon's arguments in favor of prohibiting
pornography are the same or similar to the arguments proposed by
Professors Matsuda, Delgado and Lawrence regarding racist speech.
Professor MacKinnon discusses "how [pornography] is a harm of gender
inequality, and how that far outweighs any social interest in its protection by
recognized First Amendment standards." Id. at 177.
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tions against other forms of hate speech such as pornography,60 anti-lesbian speech and anti-gay speech. 6 ' I believe it is
fair to assume that some of the arguments promulgated to support their position vis-a-vis racist and anti-semitic speech also
would apply in support of the other forms of hate speech.
Since the proposed and adopted anti-discrimination ethics
rules are efforts to regulate conduct similar to the conduct the
proponents of regulation wish to curtail, it is appropriate to
examine their legal arguments in support of such regulation.
The proponents of regulation uniformly focus on the victim rather than the speaker. They examine in great detail the
impact discriminatory conduct has on those minorities who suffer from it. 6 2 For example, Professor Mari Matsuda goes
beyond the immediate personal indignation and insult that
racist conduct can cause and delves, quite effectively, into the
long term ramifications of being a victim. 63 "Victims of vicious
hate propaganda have experienced physiological symptoms
and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut, rapid pulse
rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic
stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide. ' ' 64 Professor Charles Lawrence adds reputational injury and deep
emotional scarring to the list.6 5 Professor Richard Delgado
examines the lasting impact that continuing racism has on the
psychological, sociological and political effects of those who
suffer from harmful discrimination.6 6 According to Professor
Delgado, racial insult is a mechanism whereby attitudes of discrimination are nurtured which create and maintain "distinctions of merit, dignity, status, and personhood." 6 7
60.

See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 59.

61.

See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2331-32.

62. MACKINNON, supra note 59, at 177-79; Campus Anti-Racism Rules,
supra note 12, at 345-48; Words that Wound, supra note 59, at 135-49;
Lawrence, supra note 58, at 458-66; Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2326-31.
63. Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2378. Professor Matsuda explores

several case studies involving racist speech and the effects of such speech on
its victims. She concludes by stating that "[wihen hate propaganda spreads
attitudes of racism and desensitizes potential abusers to the wrongness of

violence, other more obvious goals of safety and order are sacrificed." Id.
64. Id. at 2336.
65.
66.
67.

Lawrence, supra note 59, at 462.
Id. at 136
Words that Wound, supra note 59, at 136. The examination of the

harmful impact racial insults have on minorities continues today. A recent
article discusses the impact upon black students who perform well in school.
According to the article, many of those students receive pressure from their
black peers not to act so "white." Being white is associated with doing well in
school. Some Black Students Bear a Burden of Being Smart, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept.
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However, the proponents do not focus on the victim simply because they believe the victim suffers long-term harm.
This alone would raise a moral issue, but would offer little legal
basis upon which to support a regulation. The foundation
upon which they build their legal arguments is their contention
that the victim has an equal protection right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from harmful discriminatory acts
committed against them.68
While the proponents acknowledge that state action must
exist before protection under the Fourteenth Amendment can
be asserted, they claim that state action is present when one of
two things occur: (1) the state offers its protection to persons
who engage in certain types of discriminatory conduct or (2)
the state fails to restrict certain types of discriminatory
conduct. 69
The first argument relies on the premise that when the
state provides protection for those persons who engage in discriminatory conduct, it acts in conjunction with or "in a joint
venture" with the speaker. 70 Thus, it not only is the speaker
who is engaging in the discriminatory conduct, but also the
state by virtue of its protection.
Second, state action is triggered when the government idly
stands by and allows such discriminatory conduct to occur.
Professor Matsuda argues that, "State silence . . . is public
action where the strength of the new racist groups derives from
their offering legitimization and justification for otherwise
71
socially unacceptable emotions of hate, fear, and aggression."Perhaps even more forcefully stated is the proposition by
Professor Frank Michelman, 72 that by refusing to regulate conduct that results in a "subversion of liberty and equal protection" of certain persons, the state is choosing "to incur those
subversions and thereby to cause them by even the strictest
24, 1991, at IA. This may be a continuation of the attitudes that are
reinforced about how minorities perceive themselves, given the attitudes
society imparts upon them.
68. See Lawrence, supra note 58, at 444-49.
69. The conduct to which they allude is discriminatory conduct that is

harmful. More
pornography.
70.

specifically,

racist

speech,

ant-semitic

speech,

and

Lawrence, supra note 58, at 445-46; Matsuda, supra note 59, at

2378.
71. Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2378.
72. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291 (1989).

Professor Michelman argues in favor of pornography regulation.
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notions of legal causation.",7 3 At the very least, the government's failure to regulate discriminatory conduct infringes on
the rights of minorities to liberty and equal protection. 4 In
effect, these assertions convert nonaction into action. By the
state refusing to act, it causes and supports the conduct that
most of society finds so reprehensible.
While the proponents uniformly agree that the victim has a
constitutional right to be protected against hate conduct, they
are at odds as to whether the offender's conduct falls within the
parameters of the First Amendment.7 5 Some contend that the
speaker's conduct may fall within the parameters of the First
Amendment, but claim the state has a compelling interest to
restrict it anyway. 76 The basis for the restriction is that the
harm to the victim that results from the discriminatory conduct
far exceeds the harm suffered by the offender whose words are
of the victim should succeed over the
stifled. Thus, the rights
77
rights of the offender.
Other proponents claim that the offender's speech should
be outside the parameters of the First Amendment. These proponents argue that the Court has recognized that certain con73. Id. at 307-08.
74. Id. at 308.
75. However, the proponents do not always make the distinction
between speech that never falls within the protection of the First Amendment
such as obscenity (Roth v. United States, 352 U.S. 964 (1956)) and speech
that is unprotected because it falls outside the purpose of the amendment.
The latter would include the prevention of a person from "falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919). Certainly, a person may yell fire in an empty theatre. The
purpose of the First Amendment is to allow the expression of ideas. Yelling
fire in a crowded theatre does not advance that purpose. It only creates a
clear, present and imminent danger, something the state has the right to
prevent.
76. See Lawrence, supra note 58 at 457-58; see also MAcKINNON, supra
note 59.
Judicial resolution of this conflict [equality guaranteed to all women
and the freedom of pornographers to make and sell, and their
customers to have access to certain pornographic materials], if the
judges do for women what they have done for others, is likely to
entail a balancing of the rights of women arguing that our lives and
opportunities, including our freedom of speech and action, are
constrained by-and in many cases flatly precluded by, in, and
through-pornography, against those who argue that the
pornography is harmless, or harmful only in part but not in the
whole of definition; or that it is more important to preserve the
pornography than it is to prevent or remedy whatever harm it does.
Id. at 177-78.
77. See generally Lawrence, supra note 58; Words that Wound, supra note
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duct does not fall within the protection of the First
Amendment, 78 and hate speech should be denied protection as
well. 7' They base much of their position on the premise that
hate speech is so reprehensible and devoid of social worth that
nothing is lost by its prohibition.8"
The case law upon which some of the proponents rely to
support such regulation is found in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.8 The Supreme Court held that the defendant's speech
was not protected under the First Amendment because the
78. Professor Matsuda notes that certain types of expressions are
limited by law such as "false statements about products, suggestions that
prices be fixed, opinions about the value of stock, and pro-employer
propaganda during union elections." Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2354.
Professor Delgado refers to the government's carving out several exceptions
to the First Amendment. He cited criminal conspiracy, defamation, libel,
plagiarism, fighting words, patently offensive speech on the airwaves, speech
intended to defraud, criminal threats, disclosing official secrets, and perjury,
to name a few. Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 12, at 377. Professor
Lawrence argues that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was
a case about regulating racist speech. Lawrence, supra note 58, at 438-40.
See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v. California
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
79. Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2356-61. Professor Matsuda limits her
arguments to racist speech. She proposes that racist speech, because of its
inherent evil, should be treated as a sui generis category and outside the
protection of the First Amendment. However, she does not advocate the
stifling of all racist speech. She states that "arguing that particular groups are
genetically superior in a context free of hatefulness and without the
endorsement of persecution is permissible. Satire and stereotyping that
avoids persecutorial language remains protected. Hateful verbal attacks
upon dominant-group members by victims is permissible." Id. at 2358. I
have difficulty with the forms of speech Professor Matsuda would permit.
First, I believe it is extremely difficult to argue that one group is genetically
superior to another or that stereotyping can occur without it having a
persecutory effect. Second, if the verbal attacks against dominant-group
members to which she alludes are racist, I believe it weakens her position.
That would mean that she is opposed to racist speech against society's
minorities, but condones it against others. If racist speech is "so historically
untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and
degradation..." id. at 2357, it would seem that she would seek restrictions of
such speech against all persons. The victim is no less harmed because he is
white.
80. See generally Lawrence, supra note 58.
81. 315 U.S. 568 (1941). Professor Matsuda does not take this
position. She argues that extending the "fighting words" doctrine of
Chaplinsky to include racist speech only would weaken the fabric of the First
Amendment. Instead, she claims that racist speech should be a sui generis
category that is outside the protection of the First Amendment. Matsuda,
supra note 59, at 2357-61.
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utterances in question were not intended to expose ideas, 2 but
were "insulting or 'fighting' words-those by their very utterance intended to inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace."8 3 In Chaplinsky, the defendant publicly
called a city marshall a "racketeer" and "a damned Fascist."
The insults resulted in his arrest and conviction for violating a
state statute which prohibited a person from addressing
another in a manner that was intended to "deride, offend or
annoy him."84
The importance of this case is the language in the opinion
that- allows restrictions of utterances if they "inflict injury."
The rule focuses on the reaction the speech causes. Again, the
central figure is the victim, not the speaker. The Court implies
that since the loss to the speaker is minimal and the recipient of
the speech suffers great harm, the emphasis should be on the
recipient. Chaplinsky suggests that while the First Amendment
protects ideas, it does not necessarily protect all ways of packaging them.8 5
In addition to Chaplinsky, the supporters of regulation turn
to Beauharnaisv. Illinois,8 6 a case in which the court held that the
accused could be found guilty under a criminal libel law for
handing out pamphlets that portrays a class of people, rather
than simply an individual, in a libelous manner. Prior to Beauharnaisthe crime of libel was imposed only when it was committed 'against individuals. However, the Court held that speech
directed at groups could be punishable, too, if that speech
resulted in harm to the group.8 7 The proponents of regulation
claim that even though subsequent cases have weakened the
force of Beauharnais,ss it still is good law and supports regula82. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication by the Constitution." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (quoting
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
83. 315 U.S. at 571.
84. Id. at 569.
85. Id. at 573-74. The fighting words doctrine was discussed in R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2358 (1992), wherein the Court noted that it was
not the content of the speech that was being regulated, but the speaker's
intolerable mode of expression. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 839 (2d ed. 1988).

86.

343 U.S. 250 (1952).

87. Id. at 258.
88. See Words that Wound, supra note 59, at 175 n.250; see also, New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court held that a libelous
statement must be directed at a public official rather than a unit of
government. Even though New York Times dealt with public officials, the

principle may be the same. Personal harm rather than group harm must be
proven before a cause of action exists.
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tion aimed at protected classes of persons as well as
individuals.
Finally, the proponents of regulation argue that the government has an obligation to emulate the international community which has become actively involved in restricting
discriminatory conduct."9 The United Nations General Assembly has adopted Article 4 of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, °° which
prohibits all propaganda by persons, organizations, public
authorities or public institutions that promotes the superiority
of a particular race or ethnic group. Furthermore, Article 4
makes such conduct a crime punishable by law."' The United
Kingdom has adopted the Race Relations Act, 9 2 Canada has
criminal statutes governing hate propaganda, 93 and Australia
and New Zealand have laws that restrict racist speech. 4 The
proponents note that the United States is the only major com89. See Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 12, at 362-71; Matsuda, supra
note 59, at 2341-48.
90. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter Convention on Racial Discrimination]. Article 4 states:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or
group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to
justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to
this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set
forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of
another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any
assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations and also
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and
incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such
organization or activities as an offence punishable by law; [and]
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions,
national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.
91. Id.
92. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(l)(Eng.). Professor Matsuda
discusses in some detail this act as well as the laws adopted by other countries
which prohibit racist conduct. Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2346 n.139 and
accompanying text.
93. R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 318, 319 (1985)(Can.).
94. Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2347 n.143.
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mon law country that has not adopted restrictions against racist
speech.95
According to the proponents of regulation, these regulatory schemes have taken into consideration the speaker's right
to freedom of expression and association but, on balance, the
victim's right to be free from all forms of discrimination
exceeds the rights of the speaker.9 6 The proponents further
claim that the United States Congress has the constitutional
power to pass similar legislation. This is so even if the discriminatory conduct falls within the parameters of the First Amendment since the government's interest in protecting the victim's
right to be free from discrimination outweighs the speaker's
First Amendment rights.9 7
These arguments are similar to those promulgated by the
supporters of the anti-discrimination ethics rules. 98 The ethics
rules supporters focus primarily on the harm to the victim and
the victim's constitutional right to be free from invidious discrimination. 9 9 Moreover, they believe that such rules not only
would have an impact on the legal profession, but also play a
role in transforming society "into one that treats people fairly
without regard to race or gender."'' °
95. Id. at 2347-48. It is important to note that while the Convention on
Racial Descrimination was signed by the United States government on
September 28, 1966, it was signed with reservation, and never has been
ratified. See Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 12, at 363 n. 154.
96. Thomas D. Jones, Article of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminationand the FirstAmendment, 23 How.
L.J. 429, 432-33 (1980).
97. Id. at 443-44. Professor Jones' article is a little confusing on this
subject. At the beginning of his article, he states that "racially defamatory
speech, the logical precursor of racial hatred and discrimination, should not
be classified as constitutionally protected speech. The value of such speech is
so slight that it does not merit the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at
433. This certainly indicates that Professor Jones believes that racially
defamatory speech should be outside the First Amendment. However, later
in the article, he discusses the balancing test and states that "[w]here speech
falls within the ambit of First Amendment protection, the government must
show a 'compelling state interest' to justify the intrusion upon and
impairment of First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 455. This leaves the
reader to wonder if Professor Jones believes the speech may fall within the
First Amendment, but the state has a compelling interest in regulating it.
Perhaps he simply is arguing in the alternative, but his position is somewhat
unclear.
98. Farquharson et al., supra note 20, at 1280, 1284-85; Memorandum,
supra note 22. This memorandum summarized comments received regarding
the California proposed rule.
99. Farqhuarson et al., supra note 20, at 1285.
100. Id. at 1284. Ms. Roberts notes that lawyers and judges have a
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One notable difference between the proponents of the
anti-discrimination rules and some of those individuals who
support restrictions against racist and anti-semitic speech, is
that the proponents of the rules have been hesitant to claim
that the speaker's conduct falls outside the parameters of the
First Amendment. Instead, the supporters of the anti-discrimination rules argue that even though the rules may infringe on
the speaker's constitutional rights, the rules should prevail
because "[o]n balance . . . the [state's] compelling interest in
eliminating invidious discrimination justifies the means."' 0 1
C. Analysis of the Proponents' Arguments in Favor of Regulation
To briefly reiterate, the proponents' focus is on the victims
and the harm they suffer as a result of being exposed to discriminatory conduct. Unquestionably, the evidence supports
the proponents' findings regarding the personal and group
harm that results from certain types of discrimination. 10 2 The
conduct in question is reprehensible, inexcusable and undoubtedly imposes severe and lasting harm on its victims. And while
I wholeheartedly agree that the victims have a moral right to be
free from discrimination, I disagree with the proponents' position that the victims have 3a Fourteenth Amendment right to be
0
free from such conduct.1
Since 1883 when the Civil Rights Cases' 4 were decided, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as
prohibiting the government from engaging in discriminatory
conduct that denies persons equal protection and due process
under the law; however, there is nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment that extends this limitation to private persons. 0 5
tremendous impact on society. "With 27,000 lawyers in the state of
Michigan, it is not difficult to imagine the effect that the threat of withdrawal
of certain memberships could have on the policies of organizations." Id.
101.

Id.

102. For example, Professor Matsuda notes that victims of
discrimination "have experienced psychological symptoms and emotional
distress ranging from fear in the gut, rapid pulse rate and difficulty in
breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension,
psychosis, and suicide." Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2336. Professor Delgado
explains that discrimination results in a justification for denied opportunities
and equal treatment. Words that Wound, supra note 59, at 135.
103. See Lawrence, supra note 58; Matsuda, supra note 59; Michelman,
supra note 72.
104. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
105. Id. at 17; see also Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
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Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment comes into play only when
there is action on the part of the state.
The type of conduct to which the proponents allude, and
the conduct that is prohibited by the proposed and adopted
anti-discrimination rules, is not the conduct of the state, but
rather the acts of private persons committed against other private persons. Therefore, the only way the proponents could
succeed in their claims that the victim has a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from discrimination is to show that the
state's conduct or its acquiescence in the conduct of the private
actors, has resulted in state action.
The proponents argue that when the state protects the
speaker, it becomes a joint venturer with the speaker; thus,
state action is present."0 6 The difficulty with this position, however, is the premise from which the proponents begin. Their
assertion is based on the assumption that the police are "protecting" the speaker rather than simply upholding the law that
requires the police to see that peace is maintained. This is miscasting the situation. First, the police have no authority to take
any position if there is no threat of violence against the
speaker. They remain neutral, neither supporting the speaker
nor opposing him. They only become involved if there is a
threat of a breach of the peace. While this incidentally may
result in the protection of the physical well-being of the
speaker, the purpose of the interference is to enforce a law that
prohibits persons from engaging in disorderly conduct.
Enforcing the law to keep the peace does not elevate the
speaker to the status of state actor. In fact, if the speaker
becomes disorderly, the police are obligated to arrest him in
the same way that they are obligated to arrest a disorderly person who opposes the speaker.
The courts have held that in order for the state to enter
into a joint venture with a private person, thus creating state
action, the state must take affirmative steps to create the joint
venture and there must be some degree of control by both parties."' 7 In defining what constitutes control sufficient to create
state action, the third circuit, in certain shoplifting cases, held
that state action may exist where there is a prearranged plan
between the store and the police whereby the police agree to
arrest, without independently finding probable cause, anyone
106.
note 72.
107.

Lawrence, supra note 58; Matsuda, supra note 59; Michelman, supra
See

generally
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the store employees accuse of shoplifting.'0 8 In Coleman v.
Turpen,°9 the court found a joint venture where a tow company
towed cars at the direction of the police. In Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co.,"
the Court found that where a private person
employed a writ of prejudgment attachment to seize another's
private property, the actor could be held liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The conduct in question was found to be state action.
In all these situations there was cooperation and control by
both the state and the private actor.
Contrary to the preceding cases, in King v. Massarweh,"'
the court found no state action where a landlord, who elicited
the help of the police, had no control over the police officers'
decision to search or to make an arrest. In Wagenmann v.
Adams, 1 2 the court held there is no joint venture simply
because a private person requests and receives the protection
of the police.
The proponents would have us believe that by preventing
a breach of the peace, the state is engaging in a joint venture
with those discriminators who are incidentally protected. However, as explained in the King and Wagenmann cases, protecting
the physical well-being of persons who engage in harmful discriminatory conduct does not create a joint venture.
The second position argued by some of the proponents is
that the government's failure to restrict certain types of discriminatory conduct results in an "act by omission" which
denies the victim his constitutional right to be free from such
discrimination. This act by omission creates the state action
13
that is needed to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment."
The proponents' argument is not sound. The Court never
has found state action where the government stands idly by
while a private person engages in a lawful activity. '" In fact,
government officials have no authority to intervene even if they
would like to because no law is being broken. If they did intervene, their intervention probably would be unlawful and could
subject the government to liability.
However, even if the courts should find that certain discriminatory conduct is not lawful, it still is unlikely that the gov108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

1978).

Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1984).
697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1982).
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
782 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1986).
829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987).
See supra pp. 20-21.
JoHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.5, at 450 (3d ed.
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ernment's failure to prevent such conduct would rise to the
level of state action. For example, in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services," 5 the Supreme Court held
that the state's failure to prevent a private person from engaging in illegal conduct did not create state action for purposes of
Fourteenth Amendment protection. The case involved a child
who was subjected to several beatings by his father after the
county department of social services failed to remove the child
from the father's custody. The child and his mother sued the
state under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of the child's
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In an opinion delivered by justice Rehnquist, the Court held that mere acquiescence does not
convert the acts of an individual into the acts of the state.' 16
The Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose "was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure
that the State protected them from each other.""' 7 Furthermore, while the Fourteenth Amendment limits the state's right
to act, it does not impose upon the state a duty to act.118 Justice Rehnquist also noted that while the state may have known
of the danger the child faced, it did not do anything to create
those dangers nor did it do anything to make him more vulnerable to them."' Thus, there was no state action.
The rule of law in DeShaney clearly indicates that the state's
inaction does not result in state action even if the private
person's acts are unlawful. And without state action, the victims have no claim for protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A more radical approach to claiming that victims are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection has been espoused
by Professor Lawrence who claims that evidence of state action
should not be necessary in order for the victims to find Fourteenth Amendment protection. He claims that, "[t]he best way
to constitutionally protect [competing interests between the
speaker and the victim] is to balance them directly."' 2 ° The
competing interests to which Professor Lawrence alludes are
115. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
116. Id. at 195-97.
117. Id. at 196; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972).

118.
119.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
Id. at 201.

120.

Lawrence, supra note 58, at 446-47. In support of this position,

Professor Lawrence claims that the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), implicitly held that private discrimination was
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the speaker's right to engage in racist speech and the victim's
right to liberty and equal protection. 2 ' According to Professor
Lawrence, a requirement of state action circumvents "our value
judgment as to how these competing interests should be
balanced." ' 122
As to Professor Lawrence's suggestion that the state action
requirement be ignored, this is highly unlikely to occur given
the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
12 3
the Court's history regarding the state action requirement.
The Supreme Court has discussed the state action requirement
as it pertains to the Fourteenth Amendment since 1876,124 and
while the Court' has discussed over the years what specific acts
constitute state action, 125 it never has considered the elimination of the state action requirement. However, even without
state action, the government still may restrict certain types of
discriminatory 'Conduct if it is determined that the conduct is
outside the protection of the Constitution. The next question,
then, is whether or not a lawyer or other person has a First
Amendment right to engage in harmful discriminatory practices against certain protected classes of persons.
Of all the amendments that make up the Bill of Rights, the
First Amendment has been the most jealously guarded by the
not protected under the First Amendment because of the absence of state
action. Id. at 448.
However, it is important to note that state action was not an issue in
Heart of Atlanta Motel because the case was decided under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. Heart of Atlanta Motel involved a
motel owner who, prior to the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, had refused to rent rooms to blacks, and stated an intent to continue to
do so after the Act was adopted. As a result of his refusal, an action was filed.
The Court decided the case after finding that Congress had not exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause. There was no discussion about the
Fourteenth Amendment or state action. Thus, it is difficult to understand
how Professor Lawrence could have reached this conclusion.
Further, Professor Lawrence claims that in Griffin v. Prince Edward
County SchoolBoard, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Court held that attempts to
avoid the Fourteenth Amendment by privatizing discrimination failed. The
Court ordered the reopening of public schools after they were closed in an
attempt to avoid desegregation of the public school system. Lawrence, supra
note 58, at 448. Again, Professor Lawrence seems to be misguided. The
Court did not fault the private schools for discriminating, but insisted that the
government act in accordance with the desegregation laws. The Court never
attempted to force the private schools out of business.
121. Lawrence, supra note 58, at 446.
122. Id. at 447.
123. See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
124. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
125. See generally TRIBE, supra note 85, § 18.
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Supreme Court. 126 While there is a recognition that protected
speech can result in harm to certain individuals, there is an
even greater fear that if restrictions are placed on discriminatory speech, other types of speech soon will be subjected to
restrictions. As explained by Justice Brennan, "[t]he censor's
business is to censor." '2 7 Once the censor has pen in hand, it
sometimes is hard to get the censor to lay it down. It is like
opening Pandora's box.
The proponents of regulation acknowledge the slippery
slope argument, but give it short shrift.' 28 Professor Matsuda
argues, "We have already taken those first steps down the icy
mountain, we have already abandoned the flat plane of absolutism." 1

29

She argues that since exceptions to free speech

already have been recognized, an additional, narrowly defined
exception that protects persons from harm does not detract
from the purpose of the First Amendment.' 30 However, the
problem with this position is that while each proponent supports the regulation of a very specific type of speech; they are
not the same type of speech. For instance, Professors Matsuda,
Delgado and Lawrence argue that racist speech should be
outside the protection of the First Amendment. 3 ' Professors
Mackinnon and Michelman urge restrictions on pornography. 13 2 Professor Matsuda also claims that anti-gay and anti' 33
lesbian hate speech "require public restriction."'
This leaves two choices. First, all the types of speech the
proponents wish to prohibit could be found unlawful. But, it is
not difficult to realize that the First Amendment will be greatly
diluted if this should occur. The second choice is to pick and
choose between the types of speech the proponents hope to
regulate. The problem with this, of course, is which speech
deserves to be protected and which does not? Is prohibiting
126. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St.. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
127. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965).
128. Professor Matsuda states, "I acknowledge that this is the central
civil liberties concern, and argue that it is as well met by narrowly defining
racist speech as it is by other First Amendment exceptions." Matsuda, supra
note 59, at 2351-52 n.164.

129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.

132.

See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2357-58.
MACKINNON, supra note 59, at 177; Michelmann, supra note 72.

133.

Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2331-32.
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racist speech more important than restricting pornography? Is
it more important to restrict pornography than to prohibit discriminatory conduct against gays and lesbians? Should we
restrict racist speech and anti-homosexual speech, but allow
pornography? What happens when others interested in protecting their groups urge for one more narrowly defined exception? Where does it stop?
The slippery slope argument simply cannot be ignored.
Furthermore, it does not have to rely on the "absolutism" of
free speech to be credible. Unquestionably, not all speech is
protected under the First Amendment. However, types of
speech that are excepted from the Constitution's protection
have been few and far between. Furthermore, over time, the
Court has been inclined to narrow the exceptions rather than
broaden them.134 For example, in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 135 the
Court's ruling was based on the premise that all forms of libel
were outside the protection of the Constitution. 13 6 However,
twelve years later when the Court decided New York Times v.
Sullivan, 1 37 the majority held that certain libelous statements
made against public officials deserve First Amendment
protection.
Even the rule of law in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 138 has
been narrowly defined. The Court in Chaplinsky held that the
defendant's words were "insulting or 'fighting' words - those
by their 'very utterance inflict injury' or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.''" 3 9 This language allows some very
broad interpretations. However, the Court in Cohen v. California, 14 narrowed Chaplinsky by indicating that before the state
can punish a speaker under a breach of the peace statute, it
must show that the utterance that inflicted the injury was
directed at a particular person rather than at the public at large,
and the speaker must
have intended that the message provoke
14
a hostile reaction. 1
134. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
135. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
136. Id. at 266.
137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
138. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
139. Id. at 572.
140. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
141. The Court noted that the facts of this case were different from
those in Chaplinsky. In the latter, the words were directed at the hearer and
they were intended to provoke a reaction in that particular hearer. Id. at 20.
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More recently, the Court in Texas v. Johnson,' 4 2 recognized
the right of individuals to create conditions of unrest:
Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a principle function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger.14

The Court struck down a Texas statute that made it a crime to
desecrate the American flag.' 4 4 The state of Texas argued that
the purpose of the statute was to prevent a breach of the peace
and that the state had the right to prohibit conduct of that
nature.1 45 The Court, however, disagreed, explaining that the

question to ask was not whether the conduct incited a riot, but
whether it was intended to incite a riot. 14 6 The Court found
that there was no attempt to provoke fisticuffs or directly insult
an individual as was the case in Chaplinsky. 147 Again, the Court
affirmed its narrow interpretation of the "fighting words"
doctrine.
While the Court may limit speech when its purpose is to
incite a riot, it has been very reluctant to approve any attempt
to restrict speech based on its content. For example, in R. A. V
v. St. Paul, Minnesota,' 4 8 the Court struck down an ordinance
that prohibited the displaying of a symbol that the displayer
knows or should know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."' 14 9
The Court noted that the ordinance was intended to prohibit
fighting words, but found that it did not prohibit fighting words
aimed at all persons, but only certain favored groups. This, in
the majority's mind, was an attempt to restrict certain disfavored subjects as well as a particular mode of the speech.
Thus, it was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
In Cohen v. California,' the Court held that the state cannot remove words from the public vocabulary just because they
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id. at 408-09 (citations omitted).
Id. at 399.
Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 409.
Id.
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
Id. at 2541.

150.

403 U.S. 15.
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are offensive. 151 As Justice Harlan explained, "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."' 2 In Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, 53 the Court found a city ordinance to be unconstitutional because it was content-based.' 54 The ordinance prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of a primary or secondary
school while it was in session and for one-half hour before and
after, except for peaceful picketing that involved a labor dispute.' 5 5 The Court held that this went to the heart of the
56 content of the speech and violated the First Amendment.1
The Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 15 7 explained, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can.
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein."'
Based on the course the Supreme Court historically has
followed regarding the regulation of speech and conduct, there
is no legal foundation upon which to build a claim that the proposed and adopted anti-discrimination ethics rules do not
infringe on the First Amendment. The rules prohibit a lawyer
from engaging in discrimination against persons on the basis of
certain criteria. 159 Certainly, it is not the "packaging" the rules
attempt to regulate, but the content of the lawyer's speech.
Since the First Amendment gives a person the right to express
ideas, even unpopular or reprehensible ideas, without some
showing that the lawyer's attempts to discriminate against a
person who falls within one of the protected classes are aimed
at a particular person and are intended to cause a breach of the
peace, the speech ordinarily cannot be prohibited. 6 0
However, the proponents argue that even if the conduct
ordinarily falls within the protection of the First Amendment,
the state has a sufficiently compelling interest to restrict it, 161
and can do so because the "impairment of First Amendment
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Id. at 102.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 99.

157.

319 U.S. 624 (1943).

158.

Id. at 642.

159. See MICHIGAN RULES, supra note 19, Proposed Rule 5.7.
160. But see, Part IV, "Discrimination by Lawyers Within
Professional Lives," infra, for exceptions to this rule.
161. Jones, supra note 96, at 458.
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freedoms" is narrow.' 6 2 First, while the state clearly has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from being victims of
discrimination, the Supreme Court has held that a rule that
infringes on the constitutional rights of the individual is valid
only where it is necessary to serve the state's asserted compelling
interest. 16 3 If there is any other alternative, then that alternative must prevail rather than the rule that infringes on a person's fundamental constitutional rights. The Court struck
down the ordinance in R.A. V after finding that, as adopted, it
was unnecessary. The Court explained that an ordinance that
prohibited the use of fighting words against all persons could
have the same effect. The latter, of course, would not be limited to "favored topics. ' ' 6 4 In a similar vein, the proposed and
adopted ethics rules are selective in their application, and
could achieve the same result if they simply prohibited lawyers
from engaging in certain types of discriminatory conduct
against all persons. Instead, like the St. Paul ordinance, they
are directed at certain favored groups.
Second, in what sense is the impairment of the individual's
constitutional rights narrow? If it is the regulation of the conduct itself, i.e., invidiously discriminatory conduct or conduct
that results in prejudice or bias, that is at issue, and the regulations that prohibit such conduct would apply equally to all lawyers, then it might be said that the limitation is narrow because
it prohibits only certain types of discriminatory conduct aimed
at certain persons. However, if it is narrow because the proponents believe it should apply only to discriminatory conduct as
it applies to race or gender, then a problem arises. The proposed ethics rules not only prohibit discriminatory conduct on
the basis of race and gender, but also discriminatory conduct
against persons on the basis of religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socio-economic factors.' 6 5 if
regulations are valid that prohibit discrimination on the basis
of race or gender notwithstanding the infringements on the
First Amendment because it is "limited," then should not the
same limitations on one's First Amendment rights also be permitted to prohibit discriminatory conduct against the other
identifiable groups? It is difficult to believe that the other
groups' interests in equality are less than those who suffer from
racial or gender discrimination. Furthermore, what about
162.

Id.

163. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549-50 (1992) (citing
Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992)).

164.
165.

112 S. Ct. at 2550.
See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.

36

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

those groups of persons who suffer from some form of discrimination that are not included among the groups currently
selected for special treatment, but later convince society of
their need for protection?' 6 6 Must further "limitations" be
placed on one's First Amendment rights to accommodate their
right to be free from discrimination? At what point will the limitations stop?
The last argument proposed by the proponents of regulation is that the government should adopt rules that prohibit
certain types of discrimination in a manner similar to those
rules already adopted by the international community. The difficulty with this position is that it would require the government to adopt laws that most likely would conflict with the First
Amendment of the Constitution. While Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination was not ratified and, thus never has been tested
as to its validity under the Constitution, it seems unlikely given
the direction the Court has taken thus far that it would find the
provisions of the treaty constitutional. Apparently, the government had similar concerns, which is evident from the fact that
when the treaty was signed, it was signed with the following
reservation:
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights such as the
right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall
be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other
action by the United States of America incompatible with
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of
America. 6'7
The fact that these anti-discrimination laws have received
recognition in the international arena does not remove them
from the realm of the United States Constitution. Even if all
the countries of the world should adopted laws similar to Article 4,168 the United States most likely could not follow suit
without first adopting a constitutional amendment that
166. Immediately coming to mind is the tragically fast growing group
of persons who suffer from the AIDS virus.
167. Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2345 (quoting Convention on Racial
Discrimination, supra note 90, art. 20 at 236).
168. Other
countries
have
adopted
laws
prohibiting
racial
discrimination. For a more complete examination of those laws see Matsuda,
supra note 59,' at 2346-47, wherein she describes the Race Relations Act
adopted by the United Kingdom, Sections 318 and 319 of the Canadian

Code, and Australia and New Zealand's anti-racist speech laws; see also Campus
Antiracism Rules, supra note 59, at 364-71.
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removes certain types of speech from the protection of the First
Amendment. If Congress should ratify Article 4 of the International Convention, and it is found to be a violation of the First
Amendment, the treaty would be void as to its application in
the United States because "[a] rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement of the United States
will not be given effect as law in the United States if it is inconsistent with the United States Constitution.' ' 169 As explained
by Justice Black in Reid v. Covert,' 7 ° "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution.... This Court has regularly and uniformly recog7
nized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.""''
Certainly, if Congress cannot adopt a provision of an international treaty because the treaty's prohibitions against discriminatory conduct would be in violation of the First
Amendment, the state supreme courts cannot adopt ethics
rules that infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the lawyers they are intended to regulate.
D. Additional ConstitutionalIssues
1. Vagueness
The Supreme Court has held that the language of a statute
or rule must be sufficiently definite as to provide warning of the
proscribed conduct to persons of ordinary intelligence.
Furthermore, it must be stated with sufficient clarity to insure fair
and indiscriminate enforcement. 173 A failure to do so will
result in the statute or rule being stricken as a violation
of the
74
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Michigan's proposed rule prohibits a lawyer from engaging in "invidious discrimination" against certain identifiable
groups of people.' 7 5 The difficulty with the language of this
rule is one of vagueness. What constitutes "invidious discrimination" is extremely difficult to ascertain. The rule does not
169.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN

UNITED STATES §

RELATIONS LAW OF THE

115 (1986).

170. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
171. Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).
172. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223,
231-32 (1951).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. MICHIGAN RULES, supra note 19, Proposed Rule 5.7(a).
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attempt to define the terms utilized, and looking to outside
sources offers little or no assistance.
The Supreme Court has applied the label "invidious" to
unlawful discrimination, 176 but never has attempted to prospectively define the term. Therefore, the only types of discrimination that a lawyer comfortably could label as "invidious
discrimination" are those types of discrimination that the
Court already has identified as such. Without a complete definition, there is nothing that aids the lawyer in determining
whether other types of discriminatory conduct are "invidious."
Furthermore, relying on the use of the word in the ordinary s.ense is not particularly helpful because, in the ordinary
sense, "invidious discrimination" is defined as, "giving offense
by discriminating unfairly." 177 It is unlikely that the drafters of
the proposed rule intended all types of discrimination that
result in unfairness to be prohibited under the rule. That
would encompass much more than anyone imagined.
The members of the House of Representatives of the State
Bar of Michigan, during their debate on the proposed anti-discrimination rule, discussed the meaning of "invidious discrimination." Attempts to define the term resulted in words being
used such as "evil,"' 78 "wrongful,"1 79 "harmful,"18 0 "painful," 1 8 ' and "shameful."82 Michigan's Judge Baxter suggested
that "invidious" should be defined much in the same way as
Justice Stewart attempted to identify obscenity - "I know it
when I see it."' 8 3 However, her colleague, Judge Kent disagreed, stating:
176. The Court used the term "invidious discrimination" to describe
prohibited conduct as early as 1884. Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108,

111 U.S. 701 (1884).
177. WEBSTER'S

NEW WORLD DICTIONARY

178.
179.

Transcript, supra note 22, at 128.
Id. at 129.

180.

Id.

181.

Id.

182.

Id.

741 (2d ed. 1976).

183. Transcript, supra note 22, at 125-26. Judge Baxter was referring
to the comments of Justice Potter Stewart found in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184 (1964). A manager of a motion picture theatre had been convicted
of violating an Ohio obscenity statute. The Court reversed the conviction,
finding that the film the manager possessed and exhibited was not obscene.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated, "I shall not today attempt
further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within
[the definition of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed
in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that." Id. at 197.
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It's been suggested that although we cannot define
invidious discrimination we know it when we see it. I
would remind this body that when Justice Potter Stewart
wrote those words with respect to pornography some
three decades ago he was speaking on behalf of a minority of the court [sic], because indeed the nine assembled
justices could not agree among themselves whether what
they viewed was pornographic or not.
In the same manner, I suggest to you after listening
to the debate of this body we cannot in many examples
agree what constitutes invidious discrimination and what
does not. It's been suggested that invidious means evil
and wrongful. In another context I find myself in
respectful disagreement with the fundamentalist
preacher down the street as to what is evil and what is
84
wrongful. 1
It quickly becomes apparent that not only can practicing
lawyers not agree on what conduct is "invidious," but even
members of the judiciary are unable to agree on how the term
should be interpreted. 8 5 Thus, the only thing certain is that
the term "invidious discrimination" cannot be defined with any
degree of certainty.
In addition to the problems with defining the term "invidious," it may be difficult to determine whether certain conduct
is even discriminatory. For example, Professor Peter Linzer
criticizes the regulation of hate speech on the grounds that figuring out whether certain speech is racist may be more difficult
than expected. 18 6 He discusses the fluidity of language, and
how terms once believed to be good become bad, and how the
use of certain terms
by different groups of people have differ87
ent meanings.
In this century alone, we have seen the preferred
term go from 'black' to 'colored' to 'negro' to 'Negro' to
'Afro-American' to 'black' to 'Black' back to 'black' and
now to 'African-American' and 'person of color.' We
remember, also, that Richard Pryor put out several rec184.

Transcript, supra note 22, at 134-35.

185. One delegate noted that, to his shock, in a room of about 300
lawyers, most did not "know what the word invidious means when it's
attached to the word discrimination." Transcript, supra note 22, at 128.
What might be more correct is that he was dismayed because most of those
present did not seem to accept or understand his definition of the term.
186. Peter Linzer, White Liberal Looks at Racist Speech, 65 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 186 (1991).
187. Id. at 211-19.
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ord albums with the word 'nigger' in the title. While he
has publicly abandoned the word, the term is often used
by blacks about other blacks, and I have heard whites say
that they use the term to refer not to all blacks but to
lower-income blacks, much as whites and blacks refer to
'rednecks.' Thus, can we put a complete ban even on the
188
use of the term 'nigger'?
This particular issue surfaced at the University of Wisconsin when two white students, in separate incidents, called a
black student "nigger." While the first student intended to
racially slur his victim, the second student, who was raised in an
integrated neighborhood in Chicago where both blacks and
whites referred to blacks that were not liked or respected as
"nigger," did not.' 8 9
It seems inevitable that the Michigan proposed rule will be
found unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently define
the conduct it intends to prohibit. There are too many possible
interpretations that could be applied, both by the lawyers that
would be governed by the rules, and by the ethics committees
and courts that would be responsible for enforcing them.
To a lesser degree, the New Jersey rule may present some
difficulty as well. The rule prohibits lawyers from engaging in
discriminatory conduct that is "intended or likely to cause
harm."' 90 While the term, "harm," can be understood, the
question is, what type of harm is necessary to result in a violation of the rule? Does the victim have to suffer a great harm?
What if the harm is simply that the victim becomes angry? The
Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson 191 has said that a person has
a constitutional right to engage in conduct that causes anger so
long as the conduct is not personally directed.
Not only does the lack of clarity raise the problem that a
lawyer unknowingly may engage in conduct that is in violation
of the rule, but because of the vagaries of the language, a lawyer may avoid engaging in certain types of permissible conduct
because she is unsure about whether it violates the rule. This
creates a chilling effect on her right to do certain activities that
otherwise are protected. As stated by the Court in NAACP v.
Button,' 92 the threat of enforcement can have as great an effect
188.
189.

Id. at 215-16.
UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp.

1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).

190. NEW JERSEY RULES, supra note
191. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
192.

371 U.S. 415 (1963).

18, Rule 8.4(g).

1993]

ETHICAL RULES PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION BY LAWYERS

41

on a person as the actual enforcement. 9 3 Clearly, a rule never
should be so vague or uncertain as to cause a person to refrain
from participating in activities that are within the bounds of the
law.
2.

Overbreadth

In addition to being void-for-vagueness, the scope of the
Michigan and New Jersey anti-discrimination ethics rules
extends beyond what is constitutionally permissible. As stated
by the Court in NAACP v. Button,'9 4 since constitutionally protected freedoms "are delicate and vulnerable . . . in our society," 195 the government can regulate "only with narrow
specificity"1 9 7'9 6 when a person's First Amendment rights are
involved.

The purpose of the anti-discrimination rules is to "assure
equal treatment for men and women free from discrimination
on the basis of race, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation,
gender or ethnic origin "198 and to promote the administration
of justice and public confidence in the legal system.' 99 And
while the states may regulate to further those purposes, they
may not do so to the extent that they unlawfully infringe on an
individual's constitutional rights. With regard to the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that if a regulation
"is susceptible of application to protected speech, the section is
constitutionally overbroad and therefore is facially invalid." 2 °°
The difficulty with the Michigan and New Jersey rules is
that they proscribe both constitutionally protected speech and
unprotected speech. Specifically, the rules go well beyond the
prohibition of fighting words or those types of libel that are
outside the protection of the First Amendment, 20 1 and attempt
to restrict the expression of ideas. According to the anti-discrimination ethics rules, a lawyer may not speak out against or
take a political stand against persons on the basis of certain cri193.

Id. at 433.

194.

371 U.S. 415 (1963).

195. Id. at 433.
196. Id.; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
197. 371 U.S. at 433.
198. Transcript, supra note 22, at 88-89.
199. Michigan Bar Approves Antibias Rules, supra note 40, at 4.
200. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974).
201. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941).
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teria such as race, gender or sexual orientation.20 2 For example, if a lawyer, in her professional capacity, should vocalize a
view in opposition to legalizing sexual activity between consenting adults of the same sex because she believes a homosexual can change his sexual preference, this could be interpreted
as violating the anti-discrimination rules. It is another way of
saying that there is something wrong with homosexuality, and
it should be eradicated. This is a discriminatory comment,
aimed at a group of persons identified within the anti-discrimination rules, and is likely to cause harm. It also is the expression of an idea and is protected by the First Amendment. 2 3 As
explained by the court in In re Williams,2 41 "[T]he lawyer may,
as any other citizen, freely engage in the marketplace of ideas
and say all sorts of things,
including things that are disagreea20 5
ble and obnoxious.
According to Professor Tribe, "[a] plausible challenge to a
law as void for overbreadth can be made only when (1) the protected activity is a significant part of the law's target, and (2)
there exists no satisfactory way of severing the law's constitutional from its unconstitutional applications so as to excise the
latter clearly in a single step from the law's reach. ' 20 6 Unquestionably, the speech protected by the First Amendment is a significant part of the anti-discrimination rule's target.
Furthermore, there is no way to separate from the rules, as they
are written, that conduct and speech which is protected from
conduct that is unprotected.
3.

Freedom of Association

The proposed Michigan anti-discrimination ethics rule
states, "A lawyer shall not hold membership in any organization which the lawyer knows invidiously discriminates on the
basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation or ethnic origin."2 0 7 Once again, the purpose of the prohibition against joining organizations that engage in
discriminatory conduct is to protect certain persons from the
202. See generally Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Mich. 1989).
203. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Doe v. University of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
204. 414 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. 1987), appeal dismissed, 485 U.S. 950
(1988).
205. Id. at 397.

206.
207.

TRIBE, supra note 85, § 12-27, at 1022.
MICHIGAN RULES, supra note 19, Proposed Rule 5.7(b).
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harm that results from such discrimination 20 8 and to preserve
the public's confidence in the legal system. 2 0 9 Furthermore, if
adopted, the rule also could have an effect on the organizations
themselves even though the rules are not intended to regulate
beyond the legal profession. If lawyers are unable to join an
organization because of the organization's discriminatory practices, the organization may consider changing its discriminatory practices rather than lose some of their more prestigious
members. Organizations have reacted to this pressure in the
past, and have made significant changes in their policies.
For example, prior to 1986, the Detroit Athletic Club had a
"no women members" policy. In 1986, a vote was taken to
change that policy, but the organization's all male members
voted the proposal down. 210 As a result of the "No" vote,
Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. and the Detroit Edison Co.
announced they no longer would pay their executives' club
dues. 21 The companies explained that they anticipated more
females in executive positions and would not offer a perk to
their male executives that could not be offered to their female
executives.21 2 The directors of the Detroit Athletic Club
responded to the announcements by voting unanimously to
make women eligible for membership.2 1 3
Similarly, in 1990, Shoal Creek, a private golf club that was
asked to host the PGA tournament, did not allow AfricanAmericans to become members. However, after much negative
publicity, as well as a threat of protest by local civil rights
groups, a few days before the start of the tournament Shoal
Creek accepted as a member its first person of color. 2 14 . Furthermore, not only did the publicity change the membership
policies at Shoal Creek, but also at other private clubs such as
Augusta National, the home of the Masters tournament.21 5
208.
209.

See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
Transcript, supra note 22, at 90.

210. Michigan News Briefs,

UNITED

PRESS

[hereinafter Michigan News Briefs].
211.

INT'L,

Sept. 16,

1986

Two Utilities Snub Males-Only Clubs, CI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1986, at

C3.
212. Id.
213. Michigan News Briefs, supra note 210.
214. Furthermore, the PGA, the U.S. Golf Association, the PGA Tour
and the Ladies Professional Golf Association decided that they would not
hold their tournaments at clubs that discriminated on the basis of gender or
race. Joan Mazzolini, Shoal Creek's Impact: Genuine Minority Progress or Merely
Tokenism?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1991, at C12.

215. Id. Augusta National admitted an
membership during the height of the controversy.

African-American

to
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Thus, it becomes apparent that prohibiting lawyers from joining clubs that engage in certain types of discrimination could
have a "trickle down" effect and help eliminate discriminatory
practices outside the legal community.
However, even if prohibiting lawyers from joining certain
organizations could bring about such positive results, the proposed ethics anti-discrimination rule still must regulate within
the parameters of the Constitution. If the proposed rule
unlawfully infringes upon the constitutional rights of the members of the legal profession it must fail. The rulemakers claim
they have the right to restrict the conduct of lawyers because
"[t]here is no constitutional right to discriminate in the political setting." '16 This statement, of course, is not correct. Persons do not shed their constitutional rights when they become
lawyers.2" 7 This includes their First Amendment right to freely
associate with others.2 1 And while freedom of association is
not expressly guaranteed in the Constitution, the Court has
recognized an individual's right to freely associate as a means
of preserving those fundamental rights guaranteed in the First
Amendment. 1 9
The Court has recognized the right to: (1) freedom of
expressive association which allows an individual to exercise
her right of speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances
and freedom of religion2 2 0 and, (2) intimate association which
allows a person to maintain certain intimate relationships. 22 '
216. Id.
217. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
Baird v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 1 (1971).
218. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
219. The Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984) states:
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected
'freedom of association' in two distinct senses. In one line of
decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central
to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association
receives protection as a fundamental liberty. In another set of
decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech,

assembly,

petition

for

the

redress

of

grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable
means of preserving other individual liberties.
Id. at 617-18.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 618.
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However, while the Court recognizes that the right to freely
associate is necessary to protect an individual's right of free
speech,2 2 2 it also has held that freedom of association is not
absolute. The government may infringe on an individual's
right to freely associate2 23 if: 1) a compelling state interest is
served, 2) the regulation is the least restrictive alternative; 2and
24
3) the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of ideas.
Certainly, the protection of its citizens from unfair and
harmful discrimination is a legitimate governmental interest. 225
But, on balance, is it more compelling than the protection of an
individual's right of association? The American Civil Liberties
Union argued in their brief amicus curiae in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees2 26 that a state's interest in preventing discrimination
should prevail over an individual's right of association.2 2 7 And
while this may be correct when dealing with organizations that
have characteristics similar to the Jaycees, the Court does not
agree that it is correct when dealing with all organizations. As
explained by Justice Brennan, the state does not have the right
to interfere with the policies of smaller, more selective and congenial organizations because of the relationship its members
share with one another. 2 28 That relationship is protected
under the First Amendment and is paramount to the interests
of the state. 22 9 This is the case even if the smaller organizations engage in the same types of discrimination that is not permitted by organizations with characteristics similar to the
Jaycees. The Court's opinion in Roberts implies that if the
Jaycees had been a smaller, more selective and congenial
organization, the state could not have interfered with its discriminatory policies. 2 0" Thus, the members' right to associate
222. Id. at 622.
223. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961).
224. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (citations omitted).
225. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81
Nw. U. L. REV. 68, 92 (1986).
226. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
227. Laurence H. Tribe, writing for the American Civil Liberties
Union, argued in closing that, "[T]he state's central purpose here - the
elimination of sex discrimination in those businesses and facilities that open
themselves to the state's public - can be achieved only by forbidding the
systematic subordination of women within such organizations; and incidental
infringement of associational rights is simply a necessary price, if in this case
also a trivial one." Brief of Amicus Curiae by the American Civil Liberties
Union for Appellant at 30, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(No. 83-724).
228. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23.
229. Id. at 622.
230. Id. at 629-31.
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only with persons of their choice would have succeeded over
the state's interest in eliminating the discrimination.
While the Michigan rule does not impose restrictions on
organizations, it does prohibit lawyers from joining organizations that engage in certain types of discrimination, including
organizations that the government would not be allowed to
regulate. If the government cannot interfere with an organization's policies, certainly it should not be able to deny certain
persons the right to belong to the organization simply because
the government finds its policies unacceptable. This would
allow the state to do through the back door what it could not
do through the front door. It would allow the government to
impose restrictions based on the message the organization promotes - something it has no authority to do. It would be tantamount to the government saying, "The state may not be
allowed to place restrictions on the organization, but its membership will be limited so long as it promotes ideas the state
finds unacceptable."
However, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument
that the state's interests are sufficiently compelling.to allow the
infringement on the lawyers' freedom of association, the proposed ethics rule still must be the least restrictive alternative.
As explained by Justice Stewart in Shelton v. Tucker:2 3 '
[E]ven though the purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less
23 2
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
If the anti-discrimination ethics rule is adopted, what actually would occur is that the rules would deny membership to
both lawyers who would promote the discrimination as well as
lawyers who would have no intention of personally engaging in
or promoting the organization's discriminatory policies. Even
if it is assumed that restricting membership of the former
should be allowed since that would help accomplish the purpose for which the rules are intended, the denial of membership to the latter group results in a flagrant violation of their
constitutional rights. The Court has labeled this type of regulation, a "guilt by association" regulation and has refused to
231.

364 U.S. 479 (1960).

232.

Id. at 488.
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uphold similar rules in the past that were based upon this
233
principle.
The Court has held that a government regulation that
infringes on an individual's right of association is valid only if
the state makes a distinction between those individuals who are
active members of the organization and those who are passive
members. 2 34 Justice Stewart explained in his concurring opinion in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona2 35 that passive membership in
an organization is quite different from active membership,2 3 6
thus implying that only active members are a threat to a legitimate interest of the state. In Baird, the Arizona bar attempted
to deny an applicant the right of membership to the bar
because she refused to answer a question on her application
about whether or not she held membership in an organization
that advocated "the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence. '2 37 The bar believed that such
membership could adversely reflect on her character to practice law. 23 8 While the Court agreed that the state had a legitimate interest in determining whether applicants for
membership to the bar were of good character, it held that
mere membership in an organization that advocated the violent
overthrow of the government was not sufficient, by itself, to
prove a lack of character. Justice Black, writing for the plurality, opined that mere membership was not evidence of an individual's personal intent to participate in the overthrow of the
government, and thus, was not
a sufficient reason for denying a
2 39
person admission to the bar.
In a similar vein, the Court also has explored the issue of
whether a state has the right to penalize a person who is a passive member of an organization that has unlawful objectives
where such membership does nothing to threaten a governmental interest. For example, in Elfbrandt v. Russell,2" ° the
Court found unconstitutional an Arizona statute that required
state employees to take a loyalty oath. 2 4 ' In addition to the
233.

Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966); see also, NAACP v.

Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1963); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
234. Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 9 (1971); United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 264 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966).
235. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).

236.

Id. at 9.

237.
238.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.

239.
240.

Id. at 6-7.
384 U.S. 11 (1966).

241.

The oath read as follows: "I, (type or print name) do solemnly
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requirement that employees take the oath, the statute imposed
criminal penalties and the threat of discharge if an employee
became a member or remained a member of the Communist
Party after taking the oath. The Court struck down the statute
after finding that the government did not sufficiently distinguish between those members who actively supported the
unlawful purposes of the Communist party from those who
supported only the party's legal political ideologies. "'2 The
Court held that persons who do not actively participate in the
unlawful activities of the party pose no threat to national security243 The Court found that the statute was not the least
restrictive alternative because it penalized those persons who
were passive members of the Communist party as well as those
who actually threatened the overthrow of the United States
government.
In United States v. Robel,2" the Court overturned the conviction of a defendant who was found guilty of violating the
Subversive Activities Control Act. The defendant violated the
Act by being employed in a defense facility while a member of
the Communist party. The Court noted that the purpose of the
Act was to "reduce the threat of sabotage and espionage in the
Nation's defense plants;"2'4 5 however, as in Elfbrandt, it again
found the means chosen to accomplish that purpose was not
the least restrictive alternative. 24 6 The statute imposed sanctions against persons who posed no threat to the government's
national security as well as against those who did. 24 7 The
Court found the statute to be overreaching and, thus,
unconstitutional.
The Court repeatedly has made distinctions between active
members and passive members of organizations in determining
whether a regulation may lawfully infringe on an individual's
right to freely associate. 4 8 While the Court has recognized
that the states may have a legitimate reason to regulate against
swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution and laws of the State of Arizona; that I will bear true faith
and allegiance to the same, and defend them against all enemies, foreign and
domestic, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of the
office of (name of office) according to the best of my ability, so help me God

(or so I do affirm)." Id. at 12.
242. These persons are known as "passive members." Id. at 17.
243. Id.
244. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
245.

Id. at 264.

246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id. at 265.
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v.
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the active participant, it has found no justification for infringing
upon the Constitutional rights of the passive member. Furthermore, the Court has held that the government cannot exclude a
person from a profession or punish an individual solely
because the individual belongs to a particular organization.2 4 9
The Michigan rule, like the statutes that were challenged in the
aforementioned cases, does not distinguish between those individuals who are active members of an organization from those
who are passive members. If the organization is engaged in
certain types of discriminatory conduct all lawyers, regardless
of their purpose for joining, are prohibited from membership.
This seems to fly in the face of everything the Court has
decided thus far.
Like the person who joins the Communist party only
because she supports the legal political philosophies of the
party, 2 50 a lawyer certainly could join a private club that does
not allow women members only because he likes to play golf on
that club's golf course. 2 5 ' Assuming he does nothing to promote the discrimination the proposed rules are intended to
eliminate, restricting his membership does not foster the state's
interest. However, under the proposed rules, he would be prohibited from joining.
If the Court continues on the same course as it previously
has followed, it is unlikely that the lawyer who is a passive
member of a golf club would be found any more of a threat to
the state's interest in eliminating discrimination than the Court
found the passive member of the Communist party to be a
threat to national security. The least restrictive alternative
would be to distinguish those lawyers who actively promote the
unacceptable discriminatory practices of the organization from
those lawyers who are members simply for the purpose of
"playing golf," and place prohibitions against only the
2 52
former.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 84 U.S. 332 (1963).
249. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1968).
250. Not to advocate the violent overthrow of the government.
251. This is the explanation given by former Vice President Dan
Quayle when he refused to withdraw as an honorary member of Burning
Tree Country Club, a club in the Washington, D.C. area that not only refuses
to accept women as members, but will not allow women to play golf as a
member's guest. Richard Cohen, The Courage of Dan Quayle's Convictions Saying
No to Cypress Point, 1es to Burning Tree, WASh. POST, Jan. 3, 1991, at A21.
252. One such rule might read as follows: "No lawyer shall engage in
such conduct that promotes the discriminatory practices of an organization if
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However, perhaps it is worthwhile to note that the Court's
opinions that made the distinctions between active membership and passive membership were decided under a liberal
Court whose policies generally were much different from that
of the justices that sit on the Supreme Court today. In fact,
only one justice who participated in the Robel and Elfbrandt
decisions currently is sitting on the bench, and that is Justice
White, who dissented in both cases. Justice White disagreed
with the majority, implying that if the state's interest is sufficiently compelling, there should be no distinction between
active and passive participation.2 5 Given the fact that the conservative arm of the Court agreed with Justice White at the
time,254 this could be an indication of how the justices might
rule today. It is very likely that the justices that currently sit on
the Supreme Court would agree with Justice White and refuse
to make the active-passive distinction.
However, even if the Court should decline to uphold precedent on this issue, the result should remain the same because
of the first prong of the test, which requires the state to have an
interest sufficiently compelling to allow it to infringe on an
individual's constitutional rights. Again, while the state may
have a legitimate interest in preventing discrimination and protecting the reputation of the legal profession, a lawyer's membership in an organization that does not unlawfully
discriminate probably will be considered too attenuated to
threaten that state interest. It is important to remember that,
while a member of the organization, the lawyer is wearing the
hat of a private person, not the hat of an officer of the court.
A second point worth mentioning is that the Court usually
has allowed a state to infringe on an individual's right of association only when the organization is engaged in unlawful activities. 2 55

The cases in which membership in the Communist

party was brought into question resulted in the Court acknowledging the states' rights to prohibit membership if the individual actively was engaging in furthering the party's unlawful
purposes. However, if it could not be proven that the person
was actively furthering that unlawful purpose, the Court would
the organization's discriminatory practices are based on race, religion, age,
gender, sexual orientation, national origin, or handicap."
253. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting).

254. Id. at 19.
255. Likewise, the court would not find an organization unlawful
without proof that the group was engaged in unlawful conduct. See generally
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
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not allow the state to infringe on the individual's right to membership.2 5 6 The Michigan rule does not make this distinction.
Membership in an organization that discriminates may be prohibited even if the discrimination is not unlawful. Again, this is
contrary to the rulings of the Supreme Court.
Lastly, if the purpose of that portion of the rule that
infringes on an individual's freedom of association is to suppress the message or the ideas the organization espouses,
regardless of how reprehensible the message may be, the rule
is unconstitutional.2 5 7 Undoubtedly, the indirect effect of the
anti-discrimination rule is to restrict certain messages or ideas
that some organizations promote. This is evidenced by the fact
that the rule does not prohibit lawyers from joining every
organization that discriminates. It only prohibits membership
in organizations that engage in certain types of discrimination
against certain persons. It is the particular message of these
organizations that the rulemakers find offensive and would like
to see eliminated. They attempt to accomplish this by telling
lawyers they cannot participate in the furtherance of those
messages. Certainly, this is unconstitutional.
IV.

DISCRIMINATION BY LAWYERS WITHIN THEIR
PROFESSIONAL LIVES

While the proposed Michigan anti-discrimination rule is
intended to regulate the conduct of lawyers in both their private and professional lives, California's and New Jersey's antidiscrimination rules have limited their scope to a lawyer's professional activity.2 5 ' The limitation adopted by the latter two
states is in keeping with the longstanding recognized right of
the states to restrict the professional conduct of lawyers while
in certain environments, 5 9 including the right to prohibit a
lawyer from committing certain discriminatory acts.2 6
To date, however, the courts have not needed an anti-discrimination ethics rule to discipline lawyers or judges who
engage in harmful discriminatory acts. The courts simply have
relied upon the rule, already in place, which prohibits conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice. 2 6 1 For exam256.

Elfbrandt, 384 U.S. 11.

257.
258.
259.
260.

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
WOLFRAM, supra note 23, § 2.6.1, at 48.
See Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 657 P.2d

372 (Cal. 1983); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660
(Md. 1989); In re Vincenti, 554 A.2d 470 (N.J. 1989).
261. Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724 (Cal.
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pie, in In re Vincenti,2 62 an attorney was accused of using racial
innuendo against opposing counsel. The court found the conduct intolerable because it undermined the administration of
justice. 263 After deciding that some of the attorney's comments
carried invidious racial connotations, the court suspended the
attorney from the practice of law for a period of three months.
The court explained that:
[W]e cannot overemphasize that some of the respondent's offensive verbal attacks carried invidious racial
connotations. Such verbal abuse, we reiterate, was
directed against another lawyer in the context of the
practice of law. We believe that this kind of harassment is
particularly intolerable. Any kind of conduct or verbal
oppression or intimidation that projects offensive and
invidious discriminatory distinctions, be it based on race
or color, as in this case, or, in other contexts, on gender,
or ethnic or national background or handicap, is especially offensive. In the context of either the practice of
law or the administration ofjustice, prejudice both to the
standing of this profession and the administration ofjustice will be virtually conclusive if intimidation, abuse, harassment, or threats focus or dwell on invidious
discriminatory distinctions."

A similar position was taken by the court in Gonzalez v. Commission on JudicialPerformance.2 6 5 Because of several derogatory
comments ajudge had made, 6 6 he was found guilty of misconduct and for bringing the judiciary into disrepute.2 6 7 The court
was aware that some of the judge's comments had been made
1988); Gonzalez, 657 P.2d 372; In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1982); Alison,
565 A.2d 660; In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. 1987), appeal dismissed,

485 U.S. 950 (1988); Vincenti, 554 A.2d 470.
262. 554 A.2d 470.
263. Id. at 473.
264. Id. at 474.

265.

657 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1983).

266. Among other comments, the judge told a defendant of Mexican
extraction that his conduct might be tolerated in Mexico, but not the United
States. He asked a juror of Japanese descent "What do fishheads and rice
cost?" and asked an African-American the price per pound of watermelon.
Id.
267. Id. at 373. The court was not at all concerned with whether the
judge had ruled in a nondiscriminatory manner. The court explained that his
subjective intent was not at issue, and that as ajudge he had an obligation to
conduct himself "in a manner that promotes public confidence and esteem
....
Id. at 382.
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in chambers, 68 but held that those comments also resulted in
misconduct since the comments could become known to the
public and reduce the public's image of the judiciary.2 6 9
Comments made in chambers also resulted in the public
censure of yet another judge.2 7 ° A California superior court
judge had referred to African-Americans as "Jig," "dark boy,"
"colored boy," "nigger," "coon," "Amos and Andy," and
"jungle bunny. '"271 Furthermore, he commented that an Hispanic attorney was "acting like a Mexican jumping bean," and
referred to persons with Hispanic surnames as "cute little
tamales," "Taco Bell," "spic," and "bean." 2 7 The court held
that the comments were prejudicial to the administration of
justice and brought the judicial office into disrepute. 7 3
While most of the case law has centered around racial misconduct, discriminatory conduct based on gender has resulted
in the disciplining of judges as well. For example, while in
chambers, a judge told an off-color joke to two women lawyers
that ended in a suggestion that they engage in a sexual activity
with him. 2 74 The court found the joke tasteless and inappropriate, and prejudicial to the administration of justice.2 7 5
Interestingly, the question of whether or not such conduct
falls within the protection of the First Amendment has been
raised in very few cases. However, where the issue has been
raised, the courts have dismissed it quite easily. In Attorney
Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Alison, 2 76 a Maryland court
had no trouble finding an attorney's verbal abuse to be outside
the protection of the Constitution.2 7 7 The court explained that
regulations against such conduct were not an attempt to regulate the content of one's speech, but were necessary to guarantee the orderly flow of the judicial system. This was, in the
opinion of the Alison court, no more than an attempt to restrict
268. When told about a deputy district attorney's wife having a
miscarriage, he commented, "Oh good. One less minority." Id.
269. Id.
270.

In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1982).

271.
272.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.

273. Id. at 99.
274. Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724 (Cal.
1988). While in chambers, but during a preliminary hearing, the judge asked

two female attorneys if they knew the difference between a Caesar salad and a
blow job. When they replied that they did not, he said, "Great, let's have
lunch." Id. at 739.

275.

Id.

276.

565 A.2d 660 (Md. 1989).

277.

Id.
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time, place and
manner of the speech,2 78 which, of course, is
2 79
permissible.
The preceding cases are illustrative of the fact that the
courts do not need an anti-discrimination ethics rule to discipline lawyers who engage in discriminatory conduct while in
certain professional environments. The rule that prohibits
conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice already is in
place and provides the courts with the necessary rule upon
which to support a charge of misconduct.
So why adopt the rules? If their only purpose is to give the
courts something upon which to base a disciplinary action
against a discriminating lawyer, they are redundant and, thus,
unnecessary. On the other hand, if the legal profession wants
to make a political statement and send a message to the public
that it will not tolerate such reprehensible conduct by its members, the rules may have some value. They can be used as a
tool to inform the public of the legal profession's position, visa-vis harmful discrimination. This, of course, is based on the
assumption that they are sufficiently narrow in scope and otherwise properly drafted so that they can survive a constitutional
challenge.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Matsuda argues that lawmakers have used limited imagination in considering proposals to prohibit hate
propaganda, and that such "limitation of imagination is a disability, a blindness, that prevents lawmakers from seeing that
racist speech is a serious threat."28'
The question, however, is
how creative can one become? While imagination and creativity can be a good thing, the limitations of creative lawmaking
must be recognized. Invidious discrimination against any person, whether or not the individual is a member of one of the
groups identified in the proposed and adopted ethics rules, is
morally wrong. However, the state simply cannot respond to
that wrong in a "politically correct" manner because it is the
popular thing to do. It is the government's responsibility to
respond to any societal need in a manner that is within bounds
of the law. This includes attempts to cure this continuing and
278.
279.

Id. at 667.
See generally NOWAK ET AL., supra note 114, § 16.47 (regarding

reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, without regard to
content).

280.

Matsuda, supra note 59, at 2375.
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very harmful problem. Certainly, every effort must be made to
eliminate discrimination, but it has to be accomplished lawfully.
While the California rules may be legally sound, the proposed Michigan rule and the adopted New Jersey rule appear
to have some construction problems. It is lawful for the antidiscrimination rules to prohibit certain conduct in selected professional environments; however, they may not restrict the content of a lawyer's speech. The Michigan and New Jersey rules
do not recognize this distinction. For example, a lawyer may
be prohibited from speaking out against homosexuals while in
the courtroom. However, outside that environment, it would
be unconstitutional to prevent the lawyer from speaking out
against homosexuality even if the lawyer is acting in her professional capacity. 2 8 1 The latter is an attempt to regulate the content of the speech rather than when or where it is spoken. The
Michigan rule faces other problems because it attempts to regulate almost every facet of a lawyer's life that might involve the
lawyer engaging in certain types of discriminatory conduct,2 8 2
including the lawyer's private life. The courts thus far have not
allowed such far reaching restrictions.2 8 3
What can be done then? First, the proposed rules can be
rewritten so that they are limited in scope similar to that of the
California rules. Rules that restrict a lawyer's professional
activities usually are approved by the courts because the state's
interest in preserving the public's confidence in the legal system usually is sufficiently compelling to override any conflicting individual constitutional right.2 8 4
Second, an advisory ethics rule could be adopted that suggests that lawyers refrain from engaging in all types of discriminatory conduct. While such a rule would not obligate the
lawyer, it would send a message to both the lawyer and the
public that the legal profession disapproves of such reprehensible conduct.
281.

This assumes that the speech is not in conjunction with an activity

that could result in the comments being prejudicial to the administration of

justice.
282. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
283. See generally Polk v. State Bar of Texas, 374 F.Supp. 784 (N.D.
Tex. 1974); In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. 1987), appeal dismissed, 485

U.S. 950 (1988).
284. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 25; MODEL RULES, supra note
25; CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 15; see also Gonzalez v. Commission on
Judicial Performance, 657 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1983); In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99

(Cal. 1982).
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Third, the local and state bars can and should continue to
make lawyers aware of their conduct and the harm that can
result from discriminatory acts. This can be accomplished
most effectively through continuing legal education efforts. If a
state bar can require a lawyer to take a designated number of
285
continuing legal education hours in ethics and drug abuse,
there is no reason why the bars cannot adopt a similar requirement to educate lawyers about the effects of discrimination.
Certainly, one of the best ways to eliminate certain undesirable
forms of conduct is to educate those who might engage in such
conduct.
There are those who are skeptical about the success of
education as a means of eliminating discrimination. 28 6 However, one only need to look to the South where race relations
used to be among the worst in the nation to see its positive
effects. In a recent article in U.S. News & World Report, Andrew
Young, the black mayor of Atlanta, was explaining that racial
relations in the South had improved significantly because,
28 7
"[P]eople know each other.... We dealt with race overtly.This is not to say that there is no discrimination below the
Mason-Dixon line. However, relations have improved because
people have learned that the foundation upon which their fears
were based are groundless. If education can improve conditions in the South, it should have a similar positive effect on
reducing discrimination by members of the legal profession.

285. Ohio requires all attorneys to take a one-hour per year continuing
legal education course in the area of substance abuse as part of its continuing

legal education requirement. Michigan, Iowa, Ohio, to name a few, require a
designated number of continuing legal education hours in legal ethics.
286. Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 12, at 379.
287. Matthew Cooper et al., Race and the South, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 23, 199, at 22.

